The economics of contracts : theories and applications / edited by Eric Brousseau and Jean-Michel Glachant.
"A contract is an agreement under which two parties make reciprocal commitments in terms of their behavior to coordinate. As this concept has become essential to economics in the last 30 years, three main theoretical frameworks have emerged: 'incentive theory', 'incomplete-contra...
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| Format: | Book |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Cambridge ; New York :
Cambridge University Press,
2002.
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | Sample text |
MARC
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| 245 | 0 | 4 | |a The economics of contracts : |b theories and applications / |c edited by Eric Brousseau and Jean-Michel Glachant. |
| 264 | 1 | |a Cambridge ; |a New York : |b Cambridge University Press, |c 2002. | |
| 300 | |a xvi, 584 pages : |b illustrations ; |c 24 cm | ||
| 336 | |a text |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |a unmediated |b n |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |a volume |b nc |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 500 | |a Includes revised and translated versions of chapters which appeared in a special issue of Revue d'économie industrielle (2002, 92). | ||
| 504 | |a Includes bibliographical references (pages 531-569) and index. | ||
| 505 | 0 | 0 | |g Pt. I. |t Introduction. |g 1. |t The economics of contracts and the renewal of economics / |r Eric Brousseau and Jean-Michael Glachant -- |g App. |t Canonical models of theories of contract / |r M'hand Fares -- |g Pt. II. |t Contracts, organizations, and institutions. |g 2. |t The New Institutional Economics / |r Ronald Coase. |g 3. |t Contract and economic organization / |r Oliver E. Williamson. |g 4. |t The role of incomplete contracts in self-enforcing relationships / |r Benjamin Klein. |g 5. |t Entrepreneurship, transaction-cost economics, and the design of contracts / |r Eirik G. Furubotn -- |g Pt. III. |t Law and economics. |g 6. |t The contract as economic trade / |r Jacques Ghestin. |g 7. |t Contract theory and theories of contract regulation / |r Alan Schwartz. |g 8. |t Economic reasoning and the framing of contract law: sale of an asset of uncertain value / |r Victor P. Goldberg. |g 9. |t A transactions-cost approach to the analysis of property rights / |r Gary D. Libecap -- |g Pt. IV. |t Theoretical developments: where do we stand? |g 10. |t Transaction costs and incentive theory / |r Eric Malin and David Martimort. |g 11. |t Norms and the theory of the firm / |r Oliver Hart. |g 12. |t Allocating decision rights under liquidity constraints / |r Philippe Aghion and Patrick Rey. |g 13. |t Complexity and contract / |r W. Bentley Macleod. |g 14. |t Authority, as flexibility, is at the core of labor contracts / |r Olivier Favereau and Bernard Walliser. |g 15. |t Positive agency theory: place and contributions / |r Gerard Charreaux -- |g Pt. V. |t Testing contract theories. |g 16. |t Econometrics of contracts: an assessment of developments in the empirical literature on contracting / |r Scott E. Masten and Stephane Saussier. |g 17. |t Experiments on moral hazard and incentives: reciprocity and surplus-sharing / |r Claudia Keser and Marc Willinger -- |g Pt. VI. |t Applied issues: contributions to industrial organization. |g 18. |t Residual claims and self-enforcement as incentive mechanisms in franchise contracts: substitutes or complements? / |r Francine Lafontaine and Emmanuel Raynaud. |g 19. |t The quasi-judicial role of large retailers: an efficiency hypothesis of their relation with suppliers / |r Benito Arrunada. |g 20. |t Interconnection agreements in telecommunications networks: from strategic behaviors to property rights / |r Godefroy Dang-Nguyen and Thierry Penard. |g 21. |t Licensing in the chemical industry / |r Ashish Arora and Andrea Fosfuri -- |g Pt. VII. |t Policy issues: anti-trust and regulation of public utilities. |g 22. |t Inter-company agreements and EC competition law / |r Michael Glais. |g 23. |t Incentive contracts in utility regulation / |r Matthew Bennett and Catherine Waddams Price. |g 24. |t Contractual choice and performance: the case of water supply in France / |r Claude Menard and Stephane Saussier. |g 25. |t Institutional or structural: lessons from international electricity sector reforms / |r Guy L. F. Holburn and Pablo T. Spiller. |g 26. |t Electricity sector restructuring and competition: a transaction-cost perspective / |r Paul L. Joskow. |
| 520 | |a "A contract is an agreement under which two parties make reciprocal commitments in terms of their behavior to coordinate. As this concept has become essential to economics in the last 30 years, three main theoretical frameworks have emerged: 'incentive theory', 'incomplete-contract theory' and 'transaction-costs theory'. These frameworks have enabled scholars to renew both the microeconomics of coordination (with implications for industrial organization, labor economics, law and economics, organization design) and the macroeconomics of 'market' (decentralized) economies and of the institutional framework. These developments have resulted in new analyses of a firm's strategy and State intervention (regulation of public utilities, anti-trust, public procurement, institutional design, liberalization policies, etc.). Based on contributions by the leading scholars in the field, this book provides an overview of the past and recent developments in these analytical currents, presents their various aspects, and proposes expanding horizons for theoreticians and practitioners."--Publisher description. | ||
| 588 | |a Machine converted from AACR2 source record. | ||
| 650 | 0 | |a Contracts |x Economic aspects |9 371319 | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Brousseau, Eric, |e editor. |9 1031546 | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Glachant, Jean-Michel, |e editor. |9 1031548 | |
| 856 | 4 | 1 | |3 Sample text |u http://www.loc.gov/catdir/samples/cam033/2002019300.html |
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