Academic Journal
When Voters and Parties Agree: Valence Issues and Party Competition.
| Title: | When Voters and Parties Agree: Valence Issues and Party Competition. |
|---|---|
| Authors: | Green, Jane |
| Source: | Political Studies; Oct2007, Vol. 55 Issue 3, p629-655, 27p, 2 Charts, 8 Graphs |
| Abstract: | There has been much talk of valence, consensus or competence politics but little theoretical explanation or empirical investigation of how this has arisen. In this article I argue that British political competition has become competence-based because the major parties and the electorate have converged on the dominant left–right dimension of British voting behaviour. As a result, commonly cited core vote explanations for party polarisation have only limited application. The electorate has converged on left–right issues, narrowing the policy space and the available positional strategies of political parties. A different pattern is found for the issue of Europe, and this is interpreted in light of possible causal mechanisms. The article offers a formal model for a rise in valence politics as parties and voters converge, and the implications are discussed for theories of party competition. I argue in favour of competence and salience-based theories of party strategy in place of a reliance on traditional spatial models. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR] |
| Subject Terms: | POLITICAL parties, VOTERS, VOTING, POLITICAL science, POLARIZATION (Social sciences), POLITICAL sociology |
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| ISSN: | 00323217 |
| DOI: | 10.1111/j.1467-9248.2007.00671.x |
| Database: | Complementary Index |