Delegation and agency in international organizations / edited by Darren G. Hawkins [and three others].
Why do governments increasingly delegate sovereign authority to international organizations and what are the consequences of such choices? This volume employs a broad range of empirical techniques to answer these questions and argues that the issues involved in controlling international bureaucracie...
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Format: | Ebook |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Cambridge :
Cambridge University Press,
2006.
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Series: | Political economy of institutions and decisions.
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | Cambridge Books on Core Table of contents Contributor biographical information Publisher description |
Summary: | Why do governments increasingly delegate sovereign authority to international organizations and what are the consequences of such choices? This volume employs a broad range of empirical techniques to answer these questions and argues that the issues involved in controlling international bureaucracies are very similar to those faced in domestic politics. |
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Physical Description: | 1 online resource (xvi, 406 pages) : illustrations. |
Bibliography: | Includes bibliographical references and index. |
DOI: | 10.1017/CBO9780511491368 |